I wrote this in 2008 and wouldn't change a word

I wrote this column about MMP 18 years ago and wouldn’t change a word. Some of the references are dated (United Future, the Tight Five, Alamein Koopu) but the system remains as flawed now as it was then.

This year, in case it has escaped your attention, is an election year. And as with every election since 1996, it will be conducted under the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system.

There is little debate these days about our electoral system, which suggests MMP is permanently embedded. Yet misgivings persist. I believe we replaced one imperfect system with another that is even more deeply flawed.

Before we go further, let’s recall why MMP came about in the first place. Essentially, it was a reaction against a two-party system that upset people for two reasons.

First, under the First Past the Post (FPP) system, a party could win power even though the opposition secured more votes, as happened when National won in 1978 and 1981.

The system shut out minor parties such as Social Credit, which in 1981 won only two seats in Parliament despite getting 21 percent of the vote. People who didn’t support either of the big two parties understandably felt frustrated and powerless.

Second, people grew to resent the arrogance of the major parties

This was heightened when, once safely in power, the two parties pursued policies that hadn’t been put before the electorate (as in the case of Labour) or broke election promises (National).

By the early 1990s, there was a powerful feeling that politicians needed to be punished. Third parties, it was argued, were needed to check the excesses of the “old” parties.

Proponents of MMP – most of whom, it’s fair to say, were on the political left – took advantage of this mood. They held out the promise of a parliament that was much more diverse and representative of women and minorities.

And so, in 1992, an indicative (i.e. non-binding) referendum was held. Eighty-five percent of those who took part voted to change the system – but since only 55 percent of eligible voters participated, it was hardly an overwhelming majority.

The referendum asked voters to decide between four alternative electoral systems, and 70 percent chose MMP. So in that first non-binding referendum, 70 percent of the 55 percent who voted favoured MMP. Again, not exactly a resounding endorsement.

By the time a binding referendum was held in 1993, voters were better informed about options. Although 85 percent of voters turned out (the referendum coincided with a general election), the majority in favour of MMP was relatively narrow: 56 percent against the 46 percent who wanted to retain FPP. On this slender basis, New Zealand adopted its most profound electoral change since women got the vote 100 years before.

What has it achieved? Let’s look on the positive side first. MMP has certainly given us greatly increased diversity in Parliament. It has achieved broader representation for minority groups and forced the dominant parties to consider their interests. Following the 2005 election, there were 39 women, 21Maori, four Pacific Island and two Asian MPs among Parliament’s 121 members.

Is this enough to offset MMP’s flaws? I don’t believe so, for the following reasons.

First, party organisations, through control over party lists, effectively decide who will sit in Parliament. This is a way of rewarding loyalists, time-servers and backroom toadies – people who, in the words of former Labour prime minster Mike Moore, suck up to party bosses. These may be individuals who command no public support and may even have been rejected by their electorates.

This effectively removes from the voters the power to determine the makeup of Parliament. True, party organisations always made decisions about candidate selection, but voters previously had the power to reject their choices. Party favourites can now get direct entry to Parliament via the party list, regardless of how the public may feel about them.

Second, list MPs are not directly accountable to a constituency. Their primary loyalty is to the party, on which they depend for re-election. This allows people to sit in Parliament who are there because of their loyalty to party ideology rather than voter appeal or hard work on behalf of an electorate. Accountability is thus hugely diminished.

Third, when people vote for a minor party, such as NZ First or United Future, they have no way of knowing which major party their preferred party might end up in coalition with.

In 2005 those two minor parties ended up supporting Labour, largely so that they could keep the Greens out of power. Did supporters of NZ First and United Future want a Labour government? Highly unlikely, since both parties have conservative support bases. But that’s what they got.

Similarly, once votes are cast, the electors have no control over what deals are done behind closed doors. All bets are off and all policies are up for negotiation. A party may campaign vigorously on certain policies which attract public support and thereby get that party into Parliament, but in the horse-trading that accompanies the formation of the new government, those policies may be compromised or traded away altogether as the price of a coalition deal. The voter is shut out of this process altogether; it’s all about compromise and deal-making.

Finally – and this is perhaps the most damning criticism of MMP – there’s the tail-wagging-the-dog phenomenon whereby small parties end up wielding power that is totally disproportionate to their limited public support. Because the major coalition partner depends on their support to stay in power, they are able to exert undue influence.

This leads to an unsubtle form of political blackmail. In the Bolger government of the late 1990s, National seemed prepared to cut almost any deal in order to humour the “Tight Five” – a renegade group that had no public mandate, being a breakaway faction of NZ First under whose banner they had been elected.

You might also recall the ludicrous spectacle of the major parties vying for the support of the erratic Alamein Koopu, who occupied a pivotal position in the balance of parliamentary power. More recently we saw the Green tail wagging the Labour dog when Labour, disregarding overwhelming public opinion, backed the Bradford bill [outlawing parental smacking] because it needed to keep the Greens onside.

For all these reasons I have concluded that MMP, far from enhancing parliamentary representation, is a perversion of democracy. New Zealanders were tricked into transferring more power to politicians while simultaneously reducing accountability and transparency.

This is not what the people wanted and shows that the desire for vengeance against the political establishment is not an ideal basis for constitutional reform. The politicians always win in the end.