Guest post: Those crazy brave Springboks (just don't mention Wayne Barnes or the TMO)

By Spiro Zavos

On a wet Paris night of driving rain, in a match of Shakespearean drama with a slippery field and ball that made handling and running difficult, a superbly coached and motivated crazy brave Springboks side defeated a resilient but careless All Blacks team 12-11, four penalties to an unconverted try and two penalties, before a crowd of 86,085 spectators that often booed them, to win the 2023 Rugby World Cup tournament.

The Springboks have now won four RWC titles - 1995, 2007, 2019, and 2023 - in the eight tournaments they have competed in since 1995. No team is ever going to beat this record of winning half the RWC tournaments they have played in. Except themselves, perhaps, if the Springboks win the Webb Ellis trophy in the 2027 RWC tournament to be played in Australia.

Two of those finals were against the All Blacks: RWC 1995, when Nelson Mandela electrified the Ellis Park crowd and the Springboks by coming on to the field in the Springbok jersey for a pre-match greeting of both teams; and on Sunday morning (EST), when they withstood a second half fightback by the All Blacks and showed nerveless gamesmanship in running down the clock in the last scrum of the match.

Remarkably, too, the Springboks won all their finals matches in this tournament by a one-point margin: 29-28 against France, 16-15 against England, and now 12-11 against New Zealand.

The 2019-2023 Springboks, winners of two Webb Ellis trophies and a series victory over the British and Irish Lions, now stand now in Rugby's Hall of Fame as one of the greatest teams in the history of the game.

The way the Springboks defended in the second half of the final, especially after the All Blacks scored an unconverted try to take the score to 12-11 at the 55th minute, and led by Pieter-Steph du Toit whose 28 tackles for the match including two smashing efforts in the last quarter on Jordie Barrett, was a hard-shouldered reminder that tournaments like the RWC are won by defence.

This intense, generally accurate defence by the Springboks (they missed only 18 tackles out of 245 attempted) even featured a series of hard-driving tackles by smaller players like winger Cheslin Kolbe, who lifted All Blacks danger-man Will Jordan off the ground twice before dumping him like a garbage bag to the ground. Peter-Steph du Toit made 28 tackles, several of them bone-crunchers on Jordie Barrett like a tank hitting a lamp post, the equal highest-ever tackle count in a RWC final.

The Planet Rugby statistics show that every South African forward (except for the injured Bongi Mbonambi) were in double figures in their tackle count. These forwards, too, forced 18 turnovers which in turn slowed down the All Blacks ruck speed to 5.05 seconds, a second slower than the All Blacks' average for the tournament.

The Bomb Squad tactic, then, had the effective of nullifying the All Blacks' 60 percent possession by making it difficult for any consistent series of attacks to be mounted. The oldest and wisest rugby adage is this: the team that controls the advantage line wins the match.

This defensive master-class had its RWC origins in the 1995 RWC final when arguably the most potent winger of all time, Jonah Lomu, in his prime after a stupendously outrageous four tries against England in the semi-final when opponents were skittled as if they were bowling pins, was smothered and often shepherded into touch by groups of fired-up Springbok defenders.

A similar hounding pack of tacklers at Paris stopped the All Blacks' successor to Lomu, Will Jordan, from making any breaks. This aggressive tackling forced Jordan to kick unfortunately long and not kick-and-chase chips which would have been more effective. Towards the end of the game, when the All Blacks were behind by a single point, Jordan was inexplicably replaced by Anton Lienert-Brown.

Before the final a New Zealand newspaper ran this headline: "Rugby World Cup: Method against madness - All Blacks stand one step from greatness".

This was more a sub-editor's beat-up in over-egging the comments that the author of the article, Marc Hinton, had written about the challenge facing the All Blacks in "dealing with seven hulking Springboks coming their way over a second half of a World Cup final that is sure to stretch the very fibre of their being".

The hulking seven referred to were the seven forwards named on the Springboks substitute bench.

This seven forwards and one back substitute split, presumably the "madness" in the headline, was contrasted with the traditional "method" of a five forwards and three backs split announced by the All Blacks selectors.

The fact is that there is an obvious method behind the Springboks' reserves split. I call this method "crazy brave", taking this description from the title of Joy Harjo's memoir of her journey through life from a troubled childhood to becoming a poet and a musician. Harjo says that this crazy brave journey is her story of "resilience, self-discovery, and finding her voice".

This is exactly what the 7-1 split created for the Springboks. It forced the Springboks to be resilient, go to the edges and over of their reserves of energy and courage and find their voice in the common cause of winning at any cost.

The Bomb Squad tactic enabled their great traditional scrumming strength. With the 7-1 split the team knows it has two essentially separate packs available to the coaches to bring on when it is deemed necessary. Dominance in the scrums leads to penalties and the Springboks have won their RWC finals, especially the last two, through the goal-kicking accuracy of kickers like Handre Pollard.

As Simon Poidevin pointed out in an excellent match analysis for the Australian Financial Review, "history tells us that points from kicks win RWC finals - in the period from 1987 to 2019, 29 percent of points in finals came from tries and 71 per cent from kicks".

At the Stade de France, Pollard kicked all four of his penalty shots at goal. The All Blacks by comparison missed several penalties and a conversion.

The scrum, then, is the talisman for Springbok teams in must-win matches like RWC finals. There is an historical imperative behind this.

This talisman tradition started in the build-up to the last Test of the All Blacks-Springboks series at Eden Park in 1937, where the winner would win the series. Paul Roos, the captain of the famous 1906 Springboks tour to Europe, sent a telegram to his successors before the Test: "Scrum, South Africa, scrum, scrum, scrum".

At that time, teams could opt to scrum instead of throwing into a lineout. Philip Nel, the Springboks captain, after the All Blacks had kicked for touch the first time in the match, trotted up to the mark and told the All Blacks, "We'll scrum, New Zealand". The Springboks won the next four scrums in a row and from the last of these scrums, the backs scored a famous winning try.

When the Springboks go into big matches determined to scrum their opponents into the ground, they are going back to the tradition set by Paul Roos.

The other aspect of the 1937 Springboks, dubbed by New Zealanders as "the greatest side ever to leave New Zealand", was the versatility of its players and their rugby intelligence. One example is the team's halfback, Danie Craven. Craven played Tests at number eight and number 10 as well as half back.

"Doc" Craven, with his two PhDs in Anthropology, was one of the greatest rugby thinkers the game has known. He wrote books on rugby theory. He was behind the creation of the 3-4-1 scrum which he had to teach to the 1949 All Blacks in South Africa. At his university at Stellenbosch he trialled all sorts of variations to the rugby laws. He told me once in an interview that the laws of rugby are "wrong" because they can't be written on a single sheet of paper like the football laws.

These qualities of versatility and deep thinking about the possibilities of the game have been used by the current Springboks coaches in the tradition of 1937 and Danie Craven. The 7-1 split relies on a number of players being able to play, and play well, in several positions. This versatility has not been understood by many rugby writers when analysing the tactics the Springboks used to win the 2023 RWC.

Take the reserve hooker, Deon Fourie. He has had a long career as a journeyman loose forward and hooker and as an international Sevens player in 2007. Aged 37 he is the oldest new Springbok. He is small for a hooker or a modern loose forward, with a height of 1.75 cm and weighing 96 kg. But he came on as hooker in the third minute of the game. He was the centrepiece of a scrum that held its own throughout the match. And in the loose he played with energy and power at the breakdown that enabled the coaches to hold back Kwagga Smith as their cover for any injured winger.

The Springboks coaching staff explained, too, that the 7-1 split was not a risk because they had players like Kolbe who could cover halfback and probably number 10 and fullback, based on his play in the final. Handre Pollard could cover the inside centre position; Damien Willemse could play as a number 10 or winger; Willie le Roux, the only back reserve, could cover any number of positions in the backline; and Kwagga Smith could play in the loose forward positions or on the wing.

The main problem with the 7-1 split is that it forces a game plan that necessitates winning the game the hard way through not scoring tries. Despite the All Blacks playing 50 minutes of the match with 14 players, after Sam Cane was given a red card, the Springboks could not score a try and only threatened to do so late in the match when the All Blacks were running the ball from inside their 22. And if the All Blacks had kicked just one of their missed shots at goal, the Springboks would have lost.

The point here is that the All Blacks missed their crucial kicks.

The Springbok coaching staff showed mastery of their craft when their hooker Bongi Mbonambi was injured by Shannon Frizell falling on his leg in the first minutes of the game. Deon Fourie was forced to come on 50 minutes before he was scheduled to. Referee Wayne Barnes was told by the coaching staff that Fourie was a "tactical replacement".

What this meant is that Mbonambi could come back if necessary and, more importantly, his replacement was not counted as such. The relevant law states that a tactically replaced player may return when replacing an injured front-rower. The replacement was not needed. But the fact that it was there, just in case, shows how shrewdly calculated the 7-1 split has been by the Springboks' coaches.

Incidentally, while Mbonambi was walking gingerly off the field, Rassie Erasmus could be seen in the coaching box, his hand covering his mouth to prevent his lips being read, in an animated manner telling the runners on the ground something, presumably to ensure that Barnes knew that Mbonambi was a "tactical replacement".

We come now to the disappointing aspect of the match: the mistakes made, in my opinion, by referee Barnes and several others made by the TMOs.

I preface this commentary by acknowledging that Barnes is the best referee in world rugby, that the laws are unduly complex and should be overhauled along the lines of the experimental law variations (ELVs) trialled in 2008, something an obdurate and feckless World Rugby has refused to do.

Much of the information in this section, but not all of it, comes from an article on Stuff, written by Aaron Goile and titled: "Rugby World Cup 2023 referee review: Was Wayne Barnes really that bad in the final?"

■ 3rd minute: Shannon Frizell yellow card.

Frizell fell on Mbonambi's leg - an incident that Wayne Barnes did not notice, even though it was in clear view. The TMO intervened, while Mbonambi was being assessed and walked off injured, and told Barnes that Frizell did "not attempt to roll" Mbonambi out of the way and "dropped his weight onto an exposed leg".

Faced with this interpretation of what happened by the TMO, Barnes had no option but to hand out a yellow card.

The law covering this incident states that "a player may lever the tackler out of contest but must not drop their weight or target the lower limbs. Sanction: Penalty".

When the TMO informs Barnes that the yellow card is not going to be upgraded to red because "he's not targeting the lower leg, but he falls on to the lower leg as part of the clearout", the basis for the yellow card is negated.

In other words, Frizell was not targeting Mbonambi's lower leg, so not even a penalty should have been awarded.

The Springboks kicked two penalties while Frizell was in the sin bin.

■ 18th minute: the apology to Ardie Savea.

Barnes penalises Savea for not releasing a tackled Springbok player before jackling the ball. "Clear release, please, you went down on the ground," Barnes tells Savea.

Barnes clearly did not see Savea make the required release.

How do we know this? Because, before the penalty shot was taken, the Big Screen showed the incident to the crowd, the players and the referee.

Barnes reaction was to say: "Sorry mate, I didn't see the replay, I thought you stayed on him. I didn't see it come off enough."

Why didn't the TMO then contact Barnes to change his decision?

Why didn't Barnes change his decision, as he did after he awarded Aaron Smith his "try" in the second half?

Handre Pollard kicked the penalty from this infringement.

■ The Cane and Kolisi high tackles: 29th minute - Sam Cane yellow card, upgraded to red; 46th minute - Siya Kolisi yellow card, not upgraded.

Aaron Goile combines these two initial yellow cards to the captains of the two sides, correctly in my opinion, to contrast the different outcomes.

He insists that the red card to Cane was the right decision. And that the Kolisi decision could have been, if the Cane precedent was followed, a red card too.

This is a line that virtually all the rugby writers commenting on the final seem to have taken. The yellow card for "direct contact" to the head was correct. But for me, the red card part was wrong.

Cane is seen standing upright to grab Jesse Kriel in a bear hug and force a scrum inside the Springboks' 22 and near enough to the middle of the field. Kriel charges into him, using his head essentially as a fend. This is one of those awkward cases, it seems to me, when the runner is more guilty of the head contact than the tackler.

The decision to convert the yellow card was taken by a group of referees in a bunker miles away from the ground, not by the TMO.

The way this transition from yellow to red operates is that the conversion to red requires a "high degree of danger, and no mitigation" involved from the tackler.

Where was the "high degree of danger" in the Cane tackle? There was no dropped shoulder. Kriel was not smashed. Kriel did not even require a head injury assessment. When the incident happened no one on the field, including Barnes, saw what the bunker seemed to see. Kriel, in fact, was the one who dropped his shoulder into Cane.

This red card meant that the All Blacks played for 50 minutes with 14 players.

It is no comfort to the All Blacks that the bunker got the Kolisi incident right. Kolisi was bent at the hips when he smashed into the head of Savea, admittedly. But his collision was much more violent than Cane's but did not go close to a red card offence.

■ 80th minute - Springboks' scrum reset.

When the final scrum of the match was being set there was 79 minutes 31 seconds left on the clock.

By the time Barnes called "set", Aaron Goile notes, the clock was set at 79 minutes 45 seconds. "The packs were steady for a good five seconds," Goile writes. "Yet the Springboks' halfback Faf de Klerk failed to put the ball in, as the All Blacks were putting on a good scrum."

Goile states the relevant law: Law 19.15 (Scrum-Throw) When both sides are square, stable and stationary, the scrum-half throws in the ball ... Without delay. Sanction: Free kick.

Five seconds is the time allowed for a halfback to clear the ball from a ruck when he has his hands on it.

Barnes should have given a short-arm penalty to the All Blacks. We will never know, because of this Barnes decision not to make a decision, whether the All Blacks had it in them to convert this free kick, not far from the Springboks try line, into points to win the final.

When de Klerk feeds the next scrum with 79 minutes 53 seconds on the clock, he did so in two seconds.

The All Blacks' big shove forced a turnover maul from the Springboks but time was up. De Klerk's great gamble paid off.

Fortune favours the crazy brave.

There were two more incidents, both involving Eben Etzebeth, when the Springboks somehow got away with play that should have exposed Etzebeth to two yellows and, therefore, a red card.

Planet Rugby is running a photo, clearly taken early in the final, of Etzebeth with the ball in one arm using his right forearm to whack Cane's jaw directly.

Where were the TMO officials on this incident?

Etzebeth's action was clearly yellow-card material- and given the bunker's decision on Cane, probably a red.

The importance of this mistake by the TMO officials becomes monstrous when we realise that not long after this, Cane was given his red card.

In the 36th minute of play the All Blacks were mounting a series of running plays near the Springboks' 22. For once they were getting quick ruck ball and the Springbok defence was scrambling to stay intact. 

A charge is made by the All Blacks that gets behind the defensive line. The Springboks flood back to fill in the holes in their line. By the time Aaron Smith fires off the next pass to move the ball out wide, most of the defenders are back but not settled. The pass is fired off. But what's this? The pass hits the body of Etzebeth as the last straggler making his way back on side.

Etzebeth raises his hands as the ball hits his nicely placed body as if to say, "What, me preventing a quick recycled ball? No way."

And Barnes accepts this feeble excuse. He tells Savea that Etzebeth is merely "running back to get back to his defensive line".

This was a disappointing ruling, to put it mildly. Etzebeth clearly timed his run to interfere with the continuing All Blacks attack. It was a clear-cut yellow card offence, given that when a pass is deliberately slapped down in an attack that has the potential to lead to a try, a yellow card is inevitable.

The reason I have discussed these rulings, which had a massive impact on the chances of the All Blacks winning the final, is not to claim "We wuz robbed". It is to put into perspective the full-hearted, hard-shouldered, gutsy, and determined running game the All Blacks played to almost pull off a seemingly impossible victory.

Despite playing the match for 60 minutes with only 14 players, the All Blacks, according to statistics provided by Simon Poidevin, "made 143 runs to the Springboks 83, beat 36 defenders to 13, and threw a total of 217 passes to the Springboks' 83, though the Springboks won the turnovers seven to three".

Planet Rugby's James White paid this tribute to the All Blacks and to the victors, the Springboks: "The All Blacks were magnificent, playing with 14 men for much of the game, most of the ambition came from their brilliant backs, but against a defence that racked up a total of 208 tackles and missed only 12 per cent of them. Territory was their enemy, forced to play from deep positions for most of the match as the Bok line speed held them back in their own half. Perhaps with that extra man things may have been different, but South Africa have made a habit of winning the tight margins and in Paris on Sunday they won the biggest one of all - the Rugby World Cup.'

To the victor, though, goes the glory.

The last word must go the inspirational Springboks captain, Solisi, when he explained the motivations behind the intense way he and his team have played in this RWC tournament: "The kids at schools are sending us clips of them singing because they know some of us like singing. People at work are wearing their green jerseys, anything that is green. We see that and that will continuously be our motivation. The majority of the people in our country are unemployed and some have no homes. For me, giving up and not giving everything would be cheating."

The 2019-2023 RWC-winning Springboks have become the team for a Rainbow Country, a Team for the Ages.

Wellington-born Spiro Zavos is a former rugby columnist for the Sydney Morning Herald and the sports website TheRoar.com.au.

Guest post: Spiro Zavos thanks the gods of rugby

By Spiro Zavos

The Rugby World Cup trophy commemorates William Webb Ellis, the Rugby School lad who was supposed to have picked up the ball and run with it during a game on the Big Field in 1823. The point of World Rugby iconising Webb Ellis is to establish the truth that rugby must be a running and passing game, not a kicking game like football.

As the wording on the commemorative stone at Rugby School reads: "William Webb Ellis with a fine disregard for the rules of football as played in his time first took the ball in his arms and ran with it."

England's Bully-Boy, No-Rugby tactics against the South African Springboks in the second semi-final of RWC 2023 represents, then, a travesty of all the best qualities inherent in the running rugby game that have emerged through the play of millions of players in over 100 countries since Webb Ellis' supposed "fine disregard" for the kicking-only game.

So right now rugby lovers around the world need to rise up in protest against England's brain-dead rejection of the essential running rugby ethic. We need to demand action in terms of significant law changes from World Rugby to thwart England's shameful regression to a No-Rugby game deployed against the Springboks.

As the nuns used to tell us at convent school: "What does it profit a man who gains the whole world and suffers the loss of his immortal soul?"

In rugby terms: "What does it profit a team to sell out the soul of rugby for a RWC semi-final win?"

Playing in the white-shirt colours of Rugby School, England disgraced the Rugby School tradition, its emphasis on sportsmanship, grace under pressure, running the ball, the thrill of the fair collision, honest physical conflict, shrewd tactics, fair play, and all the many other qualities that make the rugby game such a wonderful experience to play and watch.

Rugby should be a form of chess with tackling and running. Instead, England inflicted on a worldwide audience of 8.5 million people watching the semi-final what Gregor Paul in the New Zealand Herald called "an anti-rugby version" of the game that was nothing much more than "relentless brutality".

An English (supportive) journalist, Andy Bull, writing in the Guardian, was forced to concede that England had "a gameplan that was so devolved it was not modern rugby at all. It largely involved kicking the ball as often as possible - they did this 41 times in this semi-final - chasing after it to win it back, working their socks off in defence."

There is more. Jonathan Liew, also in the Guardian, wrote this scathing indictment about the way some rugby writers (mostly English) somehow celebrated the England's No-Rugby game plan: "So what, exactly, is being celebrated here? Certainly not the rugby itself ... England kicked away 93 per cent of their possession on Saturday night and spent a total of 73 seconds in the South Africa 22. They registered the slowest ruck speed of the tournament ... It was the first time at this World Cup that a team played an entire match without registering a single line break."

Who would want to play this sort of game on a permanent basis?

Who would want to watch this England version of cage-wrestling rugby?

England kicked so many times in the match that it became a kickathon. The pace of play was slower than snail speed. After virtually every scrap of slow-motion play the match stopped as England players collapsed to the ground as if shot by machine-gun fire. Medics and bottle-runners flooded the field, lengthening the breaks in play. Even when the excellent referee, Ben O'Keefe, told the England water-carriers to leave the field and not come back, they continued to defy him. There was constant niggling to antagonise the Springboks. Scrums and lineouts took an eternity to be resolved.

To top off all this time-wasting provocation, Owen Farrell behaved like a bully-boy leading his gang on a rampage rather than the captain of England in a RWC semi-final.

He screamed out "Hit 'em!" time after time when the Springboks had the ball. His face was contorted into an angry hyena roar as he confronted O'Keefe repeatedly throughout the match. The great tradition of rugby that the referee is the final arbiter of fact was trashed by Farrell, who refused to shut up when politely told to stop by O'Keefe.

Bully-boy Farrell was disrespectful and stupid. Marne Libbock, no great goal-kicker, was able to slot the Springboks opening penalty after O'Keefe, rightly offended by an incensed Farrell yelling at him when told to stop, penalised England 10m closer to their posts, making the kick much easier to convert.

There are rugby gods, though, and they are just. The unravelling of England's No-Rugby plan in the last minutes of the match proves this.

Let us go to the action to see how this story unfolds.

58 minutes: England 15, South Africa 6.

England win a lineout near the halfway. Farrell grubber-kicks to the corner. The Springbok winger Kurt-Lee Arendse fumbles the greasy ball. Knock-on. England ball to a scrum on the Springboks' 5-metre mark.

The England coaching box breaks out into laughter. This is the scrum, they seem to suggest, that will clinch England's win. Any points now by England will probably seal the match for them. The Stan Sport commentators begin to talk nonsense about England's "master class in winning a RWC semi-final".

The scrum is reset after an England prop puts his knee on the ground before the first shove.

The second scrum sees the Springbok Bomb Squad pack demolish the England eight. Penalty relief to the Springboks. Pressure is still on England to somehow hold on to its lead, which remains slightly vulnerable.

68 minutes: England 15, South Africa 13.

The Springboks have a scrum on England's 5-metre mark thanks to a booming penalty punt by Handre Pollard from the halfway mark.

Instead of using the rolling maul, the Springboks charge around the lineout to within metres of the try line.

The substitute lock, RG Synman, a giant of a man, smashes through three England defenders, including a passive Farrell, to score a try which is converted. The try is set up from a searing run from the back of the maul by his fellow Bomb Squad substitute, Deon Fourie.

The Springbok try has cancelled out Farrell's drop goal earlier in the half and one of his penalties, with a crucial 1-point margin left. The Springboks now only need a penalty to win the game.

This is South Africa's 27th try of the tournament.

England went into this game - and ended it - with only 19 tries. The folly of relying on penalties and drop goals only to win big matches is about to be exposed.

78 minutes: England 15, South Africa 16.

The Springboks are awarded a penalty near the 50m mark. Pollard never looks like missing the kick.

Behind for the first time in the match, England show nothing resembling the magnificent last Ireland onslaught, 37 phases in all, against the All Blacks in their quarter-final. They never really breach the Springboks' half. A casual dropped ball and it is all over for England.

And let us all thank the gods of rugby for this result.

The Springboks and their coaching staff, under the extremely difficult weather circumstances of the game and faced with England's provocative Bully Boy No-Rugby game, behaved in a smart and rugby-responsible way.

To begin with, the Springboks did not try to counter the No-Rugby tactics of England with equivalent tactics. Instead, the team and the coaching staff employed different tactics and players, from early on in the game, in an attempt to pull back England's early lead.

It was only after the match that the impish Springbok fullback Willie le Roux antagonised the crestfallen England players by imitating for his team-mates their (England's) on-field hi-fives and hurrahs whenever their side made a good play.

When it was clear, for instance, to the coaching staff that their playmaker Manie Libbok was struggling to impose the Springboks' varied game plan on England, he was hooked. Pollard, a vastly experienced player in wet weather and a renowned goal-kicker, came on. This was 35 minutes into the game. His first few plays were to try to move the ball through the backs.

As Paul Cully has pointed out in the Sydney Morning Herald, the Springboks won their way into the semi-finals by playing, or trying to play, ball-in-hand modern rugby. In their losing 8-13 match against Ireland, the Springboks kicked 16 times to Ireland's 20.

But the coaches worked out by half-time that England's No-Rugby tactics and the windy and cold conditions required the Springboks to play a more restricted game plan based on dominance in the set pieces. This, in turn, meant that all 23 of the playing squad had to spend significant time on the field to make a significant impact.

With Pollard already on the field, the coaches early in the second half replaced the talismanic second-rower, Eben Etzebeth, with the try scorer Synman.

Was there a thought about keeping Etzebeth, a workhorse during the tournament, slightly fresher for the final? Probably not. Etzebeth had lacked his usual energy and power. He was replaced by a bigger and more powerful player.

To provide more energy in the backs, Cobus Reinach was replaced by the aggressive Faf de Klerk and Damian Willemse, who was finding the conditions a challenge to his dry-field skills, was replaced by the experienced Willie le Roux.

Then Vincent Koch, Ox Nche and Deon Fourie came on. By the 45th minute the Springboks' coaches had taken their big gamble and unleashed their Bomb Squad to change, they hoped, what looked like an inevitable England victory.

And the gamble worked, but with only minutes remaining in the match. It was a close-run thing and the early intervention was probably the key factor in the ultimate win.

The Springboks coaching staff provided a real-time master class in crisis management. Sir Clive Woodward reckons this staff is the best technical coaching staff currently in the world rugby.

I'm inclined to agree. They have tried to make the standard power game of the Springboks more expansive. They have been innovative with using their reserves, especially in the way they have occasionally loaded the bench with up to seven forwards and one back. Some of their set plays, too, especially in the forwards, have been imaginative.

They have in effect created two teams within their 23-man squad on match day: an expansive side to start the match and a power squad to finish it.

And just to finish, a note on the All Blacks' superlative seven-try victory over a courageous Pumas in the first semi-final.

Elements of the British media that praised England's No-Rugby effort diminished the All Blacks' victory by suggesting, for instance, that their "ruthless efficiency on both sides of the ball turned the RWC semi-final against Argentina ... into little more than a training run".

This putdown does not take notice of the spirited start the Pumas made when attack after attack, with ball in hand and hard-shouldered running, put pressure on the All Blacks' defence. And it diminishes the excellent of the All Blacks attack that saw them score a record number of tries against a historically tough Pumas defence.

Greg Gardner, the Australian referee, was accused of turning the match in favour of the All Blacks when he ruled an advantage over, which in turn led to a try by the All Blacks flanker Shannon Frizell.

According to Andy Bull in the Guardian, this was the "one last moment when it looked as though Argentina might just cling on, when New Zealand were leading 15-6 and conceded a knock-on in kicking distance, but it came and went as quickly as the advantage Gardner awarded for it".

This is a nonsense analysis.

To begin with, knock-ons result in scrums, not penalties, and the All Blacks' scrum monstered the Pumas eight throughout the match.

Second, Gardner, who had an excellent match, explained to the Pumas' captain that his team had cleared play from two rucks successfully before they knocked the ball on. Under the laws of rugby, Gardner was required to call the advantage over: "Advantage ends when the referee deems that the non-offending team has gained an advantage." This clearly was the case in the sequence under discussion.

Bull, along with a number of other British journalists, was also critical of the All Blacks' coaching staff for playing out the last six minutes of play without allowing Scott Barrett to return from his yellow card sin bin: "Apparently, they decided that it would be better preparation for next week to play a man short for the last five minutes. So the Cup semi-final ended up being treated like a practice match."

Again, this is a nonsense analysis.

The All Black coaches had cleared their bench of reserves before Barrett was sent to the sin bin. There was no player to replace him. There were six minutes of play to go and the All Blacks were leading 44-6. If Barrett went back on to the field there remained the risk of him getting another yellow card - slight, perhaps, but a risk. Two yellow cards make up a red card. And a red card would mean that he would not play in the RWC final.

The fact is that the All Blacks were the most impressive of the sides playing in the semi-finals. As the UK Telegraph writers, Daniel Schofield and Cameron Henderson, noted: "The All Blacks may have lost some of their aura in recent years, but their speed of thought and deed make them a frightful proposition heading into their fifth final."

So the All Blacks and the Springboks go into the final of RWC 2023 with the splendid record of both teams having won the Webb Ellis trophy three times. The Springboks have played in two fewer tournaments than the All Blacks, starting their participation in RWC 1995. They also defeated the All Blacks in the RWC 1995 final when President Nelson Mandela, wearing a Springboks jersey, came on to Ellis Park to shake hands with the teams. The two teams have played each other five times in RWC tournaments, with the All Blacks winning three and the Springboks two.

This match-up on Sunday morning of the two best teams in RWC history, with one of them to became a four-times Rugby World Champion, looks like being a rugby game for the ages.

Tying this essay together, then, in an effort to make sense of last weekend's RWC 2023 semi-finals, is this liturgy:

The rugby they play in Heaven was played by the All Blacks against the Pumas.

The rugby they play in Purgatory was played by the Springboks against England.

The rugby they play in Hell was played by England against the Springboks.

Wellington-born Spiro Zavos is a former rugby columnist for the Sydney Morning Herald and the sports website TheRoar.com.au.

Guest post: Spiro Zavos on that torrid RWC quarter-final and the Irish curse

Ireland were not literally or even metaphorically hung or drawn by the New Zealand at Stade de France. But they were quartered, as in being booted out of the tournament by a brilliant All Blacks team 28 -24.

An enduring sequence of quarter-final failures at RWC tournaments has now become The Curse for Ireland.

Tim Horan in his comments on the match made the point that quarter-finals are the most important round of the RWC tournament because success ensures the winning teams of access to the last two weeks of play, with semi-finals and a third-place playoff possibilities, and the final for the last two teams standing.

The Stade de France result, in a RWC tournament that Ireland expected to win - a prediction supported by heavyweight rugby pundits - is now the eighth lost RWC quarter-final the men in green have experienced in all eight of their RWC quarter-final appearances: 1987, 1991, 1995, 2003, 2011, 2015, 2019 and now 2023.

To add to this misery, the last time Ireland even led its opponents in a RWC quarter-final was back in 1995.

Ireland is the only one of the so-called Home Unions (the others being Wales, Scotland and England) that has never progressed to a RWC semi-final.

Compare this record with England's. In this RWC 2023, a lacklustre England side with a newish coach, Steve Borthwick, who replaced Eddie Jones, defeated Fiji at Marseilles 30 -24, in its quarter-final match. It now faces South Africa in the semi-finals.

This is the sixth RWC quarter-final match England has won out of the nine they have played.

England, also, are the only Northern Hemisphere team that has won the Webb Ellis trophy, with their famous triumph in RWC 2003.

There are various reasons, presumably, why Ireland has been defeated in all its RWC quarter-final matches. We cannot canvas them all here. But I think I can pinpoint the reason why The Curse struck this time. Just follow me with this because it is slightly complicated.

The draw for RWC 2023 was correctly described by rugby pundits as "bizarre".

The top four teams in the world, Ireland, South Africa, France and New Zealand, were loaded into the same half of the draw, in Pool A and Pool B.

In the pool rounds Ireland played South Africa and France played New Zealand. The losers of these Big Four pool round matches played the winner in their respective quarter-finals.

The way this draw worked out meant that in the quarter-finals, Ireland, a winner of their pool round match against South Africa, played New Zealand, a loser in their quarter-final against France, with France playing South Africa in their quarter final.

This, in turn, meant that two of the four teams that had a good chance of winning the RWC 2023 tournament would be eliminated in the quarter-finals.

In effect, the quarter-finals for this 2023 RWC tournament became the semi-finals.

Now, here is the interesting part. Both of the teams defeated in the pool round, New Zealand and South Africa, went on to beat their previously undefeated pool round opponents, Ireland and France.

My take from all of this is that behind Ireland's loss to the All Blacks was the energy-sapping physical and mental effort the men in green invested in their hard-fought pool-round victory over the Springboks.

In that match Ireland played all its cards - its retaining-the-ball tactics, its energy, its will-to-win, its muscular defence and its emotional capital - to defeat the Springboks 13-8.

In terms of the way RWC tournaments work, a team can lose a pool round and still win the tournament. The Springboks did this in RWC 2019 - and with their victory over France, are in the hunt to repeat their triumph of four years ago.

By playing all its cards in its pool-round match against the Springboks, Ireland, in my opinion, won the poker-hand pool round. But this win set the team up for losing the big payout of a quarter-final triumph. It was, as the ancients would put it, a pyrrhic victory for the ages.

The Ireland that played the All Blacks at Stade de France in the knock-out quarter-final did not have the same flair and hardness, both mental and physical, as the All Blacks. They were a team that seemed to play by numbers more than passion. They were rote rather than inventive in adapting to the circumstances that unfolded during the game.

Ireland never played the ball wide in the match even though the All Blacks were operating a tight defensive line. Johnny Sexton did not try even one of his trademark and deadly effective loop plays. The team was off the pace both on attack and defence. Where were the killer plays they have routinely pulled off in Tests over the last four years?

Stephen Jones, never one to praise the All Blacks, explained Ireland's problems in trying to win the match this way: "Ireland probably had the majority of possession, and they let nobody down, but on the day they seemed to be up against a team who were tactically and probably technically superior, and Johnny Sexton at fly-half simply could not conjure up a winning score as the game went on and on."

I believe that while the All Blacks did not throw their match against France, they did not, as Ireland did against the Springboks, reveal their full arsenal of attacking and defensive plays and expend all their physical and mental energy against up pumped-up France in the opening match.

In other words, they weren't greatly worried if they lost this opening match of the 2023 RWC tournament.

They anticipated that Ireland would defeat the Springboks. This meant the All Blacks would have to play Ireland in the quarter-final, rather than the Springboks. My hunch is that the All Blacks coaching staff were more comfortable playing Ireland than they were about countering the Springboks early in the finals.

In the back of the mind of the All Blacks coaching staff (and please remember I am surmising this) was the thought that Ireland's two successive wins against New Zealand in 2022 were helped significantly by yellow cards that were dished out against the All Blacks.

In fact, in a media conference after the All Blacks' victory over Ireland at Stade de France, coach Ian Foster talked about the two yellow cards dished out to his players by referee Wayne Barnes (who also controlled the third New Zealand-Ireland Test in 2022) and how Ireland seemed to magically conjure yellow cards against their opponents from willing referees.

And on the All Blacks coaching staff was Joe Schmidt, the former Ireland coach who started that team on its road from a middle-tier rugby nation to a world power.

It was under Schmidt that Johnny Sexton became a world class number 10. Schmidt, presumably, gave the All Blacks inside knowledge of the attacking plays Sexton likes to use. And, more importantly, how to counter these plays.

Schmidt's game plan for Ireland, too, when he coached them, remained essentially Farrell's game plan, There was a slight difference in that Farrell, a former rugby league hardman, has given a toughness and abrasive quality to Ireland's defence.

To put all of this theorising into some match-play context, it is curious that against France the All Blacks invariably kicked long and played Beauden Barrett often as the first playmaker.

In my comments after this match, I argued that the All Blacks could not win the RWC tournament or indeed even get out of the quarter-finals if this pattern of using Barrett was continued.

Against Ireland, interestingly, there was an entirely different strategy. Aaron Smith and Richie Mo'unga kicked short-high balls for their forwards to regather, and Beauden Barrett and Mo'unga kicked lobs over the top of the Irish defenders for themselves to grab and carry on the attack.

Beauden Barrett was kept out of the first receiver role and Mo'unga was given the major responsibility for calling the plays. Mo'unga had the role of playmaker and Barrett the role of an attacking third winger-fullback.

Before the tournament started the South African rugby greats, Jean de Villiers and Victor Matfield, predicted that France would play the Springboks and the All Blacks would play Ireland in the quarter-finals. Did they reveal a master plan from the Springboks camp? Anyway, as President Joe Biden famously said about a different situation, "Son of a gun, what do you think happened?"

For the record, the All Blacks' loss to France was their first ever RWC pool round loss. It was noticeable that the All Blacks coaching staff seemed to accept the loss with calmness rather than any sense of panic.

As for RWC quarter-finals, the All Blacks record is now nine matches and eight wins. The one loss was in RWC 2007 when France pulled off an upset victory at Cardiff 20-18. And here we come to another part of the puzzle of the All Blacks' remarkable revival of form against Ireland.

The referee for that Cardiff match was a callow newcomer: Wayne Barnes.

A report of the match by Pro Sport noted that the All Blacks were "hammered in the penalty count by a young English referee, Wayne Barnes".

I wrote in The Roar about this upset loss by the All Blacks that "remarkably, Wayne Barnes did not give the All Blacks a single penalty in the final 60 minutes of play", even though they were camped inside the French 22 for most of that time hammering away at the try line.

I pointed out, too, that "Barnes and his assistant referee, Jonathan Kaplan, who was metres away from the incident, missed an obvious forward pass in the build-up to France's second try, the match-winner".

That loss remains deeply entrenched in the New Zealand psyche. Many New Zealanders have never forgiven Barnes for his refereeing on that day.

But, and this is the important point, the All Blacks have moved on from RWC 2007. They acknowledge - rightly - that Barnes is now one of the best referees in world rugby. He knows the names of the rugby players, he speaks French to the French players, he is accurate with his decisions and is not afraid to make tough calls.

The All Blacks showed this respect early in the quarter-final when the Man of the Match, Ardie Savea, was penalised by Barnes for a mistake in the ruck.

Savea looked up at Barnes as he clambered to his feet, got an explanation, nodded his head in agreement and got back into position for the next play. Savea then went on to make several crucial turnovers that passed the Barnes scrutiny.

At scrum-time, too, Barnes correctly ruled against the Ireland front row's boring in and wheeling the scrum tactics, decisions that gave the All Blacks some early and welcome penalties.

He was just as accurate and tough, though, on the All Blacks, giving them two yellow cards: one for collapsing a maul on their try-line and another to Aaron Smith for sticking out an arm that prevented an Ireland pass going to hand during an attacking movement. This second yellow card seemed a bit harsh but was seemingly imposed on Barnes by the TMO.

Minutes into full time, after Ireland had launched the most determined attack in RWC history with 37 or 39 phases (counts vary) to enforce a winning try, Barnes, with great integrity given the feverish Irish supporters cheering on their side's onslaught, awarded a turnover penalty to Sam Whitelock.

The decision meant that the All Blacks only had to kick the ball into touch legally, that is with an initial tap, and the match was over.

Barnes' refereeing performance, in fact, prompted the former England player Nic Easter to praise him this way: "Wayne Barnes doesn't miss a thing. He has been able to spot things that other referees might overlook, His performance played a crucial role in an incredible game."

The reaction to decisions made by Barnes from some of Ireland's supporters at the Stade de France and on social media, in the context of the superb display of the refereeing craft he gave, was disgraceful.

It was matched, unfortunately, by Johhny Sexton's verballing of Barnes throughout the match. The contrast between this behaviour by Sexton and Savea's spoke a lot about the mental strength of the two players.

Even when Barnes explained correctly, on one occasion, that Bundee Aki's head had not been hit or even touched by an All Black player, Sexton continued to badger him to give a penalty to Ireland. It was as if Sexton was blaming the referee for the way the match was turning against Ireland.

I always think that when players start blaming the referee for their own poor play they are well on the road to a defeat.

It seemed to me, too, as if Ireland's feverish fervour for a quarter-final victory was so intense for some of the team's players and supporters that the normal good grace of the Ireland team and its supporters was put on hold for the game.

It was disappointing, for instance, for anyone who has a regard for the traditions of rugby that the crowd, Ireland supporters in their tens of thousands, deliberately drowned out the chanting of the All Blacks haka, a rugby ritual that goes back to the Wales-New Zealand first Test at Cardiff Arms Park in 1905.

Irish crowds are famous for their respect for opposition sides, even to the extent of imposing a cone of silence around the ground when there are kicks at goal. So it was out of character that their enthusiasm for their side at the Stade de France saw them show such disrespect for Ireland's opponents on the day.

Where Ireland go next in the world rankings and as a major rugby power is an intriguing question. Coach Andy Farrell concedes that the great team he brought to this RWC tournament no longer exists.

Can he construct another great Ireland side in the next four years?

Will the small number of fully professional rugby players available for selection, about 160 of them, create a large enough pool of talent capable of continuing to win major tournaments?

We are told that Ireland's system of a handful of elite clubs, clear pathways for young players to learn how to play effective rugby through academies and a strong school competition should ensure strong numbers coming into the professional game.

There is also a great tradition of playing rugby in Dublin in the great Public Schools that goes back at least to pre-1914 days when James Joyce, of all people, wrote about the game in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, admittedly expressing his character's reluctance to get out of bed on chilly mornings to go to rugby practice.

And then there is a theory that can be called Rugby Darwinism.

Let me introduce Ben Darwin, a former Wallaby prop forward, now the founder of Gain Line Analytics, a sports analytics firm, and his "teamwork index" theory.

This account of Darwin's "teamwork index" is based on an article in the Australian Financial Review (17/09/23) by Jonathan Shapiro, where he explained the TWI this way:
"It is based on three measures - long-term cohesion, which is the time team members have spent playing together more than two years ago: medium term cohesion - which is time spent within two years, and finally in-season cohesion, which has the highest weighting.

'It led to the conclusion that money buys skill, but not success, that talent flourishes best in familiar environments and greatness is built carefully and methodically."

Ireland's current success at club and international rugby, according to Darwinism, is due in large part to the "cohesiveness" the national team has achieved through players having played together for years at school, club and then international level.

Paul Cully, in the Sydney Morning Herald, has pointed out that 10 of Ireland's starting XV against Scotland, for instance, play for Leinster.

Ben Darwin has touted Ireland's recent defeats of the All Blacks as proof of his TWI theory. Moreover, he has predicted that Northern Hemisphere teams will start defeating Southern Hemisphere teams on a more regular basis than in the past as they reduce the number of club sides they have in their premier competitions.

Well, perhaps or perhaps not. 

My view is that Rugby Darwinism may work from time to time with nations with a small pool of players.

But the future, it seems to me, still remains with the traditional rugby powers of South Africa and New Zealand with their deep rugby culture, their history of success, the extensive pool of players, their coaching excellence and their long pathways for players of ability to come through to their national teams.

The diversity of New Zealand rugby, with Maori and, increasingly, Pacific Island players being involved in national teams and in leadership positions, has always been its greatest strength.

South African rugby is flourishing, too, in terms of competitions won since the game and leadership positions were opened up to all races in the Republic.

This future of South African and New Zealand hegemony, of course, will always be challenged by other nations, like France, Australia, Argentina, England, Wales and Ireland (if that team can ever beat The Curse of the RWC quarter-final).

But the Rugby Darwinism theory needs to embrace the hard fact that all these teams, with the exception of the Wallabies, between them have won only one Webb Ellis trophy since Rugby World Cup tournaments started in 1987.

And as the quarter-finals of RWC 2023 seem to suggest, a continuing dominance by the top Southern Hemisphere teams is informed on results rather than spreadsheets.

Three of the four winners of last weekend's quarter-finals - New Zealand, South Africa and Argentina - are the dreaded Southern Hemisphere part of the rugby power zone.

At the beginning of the RWC 2023 tournament several British rugby writers fearlessly predicted that the semi-finals could include, for the first time, all Northern Hemisphere teams.

This brings me to my punch line to sum up RWC 2023 results so far  - a joke that is doing the rounds of rugby tragics:

"Rugby is a simple game. Thirty men chase a ball for 80 minutes, and at the end, a Southern Hemisphere team wins the World Cup."

Boom, boom.

Spiro Zavos: Sun Tzu and the art of winning the Rugby World Cup

Spiro (pictured) is a New Zealander who for decades wrote a popular rugby column in the Sydney Morning Herald. He has kindly agreed to have his thoughts on the RWC published on this site.

A coach of the fabled Notre Dame gridiron team was once asked about the secret of his team's success. "Prayers work best when players are big," he replied. 

After observing the exciting opening round of the 2023 Rugby World Cup tournament, I would add a clarification to this comment: "Big players need to play big while small players can play big by leading their team with ultra smart rugby."  

We saw a splendid example of a big player (finally) playing big with Will Skelton, a 120 kg, 203cm giant, turning in a massive performance for the Wallabies in their commanding 35-15 victory over Georgia. 

The fearsome Georgia pack, with their pirate beards, swelling bellies and tree trunk legs, lost their usual swagger and were reduced to a bewildered gang arguing with each other by Skelton's frequent power plays.

The captain of the Wallabies was helped in this demolition job on the Georgia pack by powerful and athletic play from Taniela Tupou, the 140kg prop, and coach Eddie Jones' golden discovery, Tom Hooper, a 122kg, 199cm flanker who plays like Owen Finegan of blessed RWC 1999 memory.

The Australian's Jamie Pandaram headed his article on Skelton's sensational performance: "Giant leap for Wallabies skipper who's proving his weight in gold".

The article pointed out that when Skelton was playing at 145kg as a younger player he could not make the starting lineup of the Waratahs. It is not enough, in other words, to be big. A big rugby player has to actually play big.

This playing-big attitude started for Skelton when he was released to Saracens, the English rugby club closest to the Crusaders in their preparation of their players. Skelton reduced his weight under extensive training to 130kg, still presenting as a massive presence. He was taught how to manipulate his size by mastering the technical aspects of tight forward play. 

Against Georgia, Skelton was a force of nature. He smashed Georgia's rolling maul. He made powerful runs that dented Georgia's defensive line. He won turnover ball. And in one of the last lineouts of the match, he jumped easily to win a lineout, a skill that many pundits believed he did not have in his arsenal.

Pandaram also made the interesting point that World Cups have been defined by forwards who rise to a level that seems unbelievable,' 

He cited Pieter-Steph du Toit in 2019, Kieran Read in 2015, Jerome Kaino and Thierry Dusautoir in 2011 and Victor Matfield in 2011 as RWC dominators. "Skelton can sit among these kings," Pandaram wrote.

The small man playing big syndrome was illustrated by George Ford who drove England to an unlikely and very comfortable 27-10 victory over the Pumas. The victory and its margin was unlikely because for 70 minutes or so England played with a 14-man side. 

RWC tournaments have seen many brilliant performances by number 10s, the likes of Grant Fox, Michael Lynagh, Joel Stransky, Stephen Larkham, Jonny Wilkinson and Dan Carter. 

But Ford's performance was, in my opinion, the biggest big game any number 10 has played in a RWC tournament. 

England were a team that had won only four out of their previous 13 Tests and among the losses was a defeat handed out to them by the Pumas at Twickenham only a few weeks ago. But Ford, in a remarkable sequence of skill, intuition and execution, played the Pumas out of the game and possibly out of the RWC tournament. 

He booted over three dropped goals and six penalties to boost a pack of Dad's Army veterans to master a tough Pumas pack into errors and then submission.  

It was Ford's big-man thinking that he was determined to win the game as the playmaker and points-scorer, rather than try not to lose it, that thrilled me. As he told reporters after the match: "We were a man down early and we had take points when we gained field position."

The clarity of the drop-kicking option lay in the fact it didn't matter that England were a man down. He needed the ball somewhere within kicking distance and enough forwards to form a sort of block on charging Pumas. His technique was deadly under pressure and distance from the goal posts for all his kicks.

England's coaching staff have a real dilemma on their hands now. The England backline with Ford and Manu Tuilagi at number 10 and inside centre worked so well on attack and defence that the position of the suspended England captain Owen Farrell becomes an issue for England when he can return from suspension after the next match.

There is no way that Ford could have performed his rescue act for England with Farrell at inside centre and sharing the playmaker role.

If there needs to be further proof that the two-playmaker system does not work, we need to look no further than the All Blacks and their loss to France in the opening match of the 2023 RWC tournament. 

The media have pointed out that this is the first time the All Blacks have lost a match in the pool stages of the tournament. As the Springboks proved in winning the RWC 2019 tournament, teams - or one team at least since the tournament started in 1987 - can win after losing in the pool round. 

But what has not really been acknowledged is that 27-13 scoreline was the worst ever inflicted on the All Blacks in the history of the RWC.

It is obvious now, or should be, that the All Blacks selector-coaches have made a massive mistake in not entrusting the team four years ago to the playmaking leadership of Richie Mo'unga, the way previous RWC-winning All Black sides were entrusted to one playmaker, mainly Grant Fox in 1987 and Dan Carter in 2011 and 2015.

In the match against France, Barrett seemed to play in the line more than Mo'unga, who was camped at fullback for long periods of play. The effect of this meant that there was no consistent method in the way the All Blacks tried to counter the France's arrow-like rush defence

Mo'unga's skill is running the game, in the line, with the occasional searing break of his own. All the time.  He needs to have his hands on the ball in most of the plays, calling them from virtually every set piece, ruck and maul. 

This is elementary 101 playmaking theory. All Blacks coach Ian Foster, a former number 10 himself, should know this. 

He should also know that Beauden Barrett, one of the great players of his era, is a shadow of his former self as a player. In my opinion, the terrible concussion he suffered in the 2022 Test against Ireland at Aviva Stadium has had a dulling effect on his former brilliant running game.

This infatuation with the two-playmakers game and poor selection has also impacted on the positions key players have been placed in. 

Barrett at this time in his career could be used as a reserve who could play cameos at fullback or number 10. Will Jordan should be the starting fullback for the All Blacks.

Jordan as a fullback, as he does for the Crusaders, would be mainly running, where he is a match-winner, and occasionally putting in kicks. He would not be subjected to the ordeal, as he was against France, of having to chase Barrett's high kicks, most of them too long and not high enough, with the risk of getting his timing wrong. 

As it was, he failed to snatch any of the high balls the French backs were challenged with. But he was yellow-carded once and could easily have been charged again, which would have been red-card territory and dangerous ground for him as far as staying in the tournament. 

The official excuse for the high-ball tactic by the All Blacks apparently was that it would conserve the energy of the players in the torrid heat. 

But chasing 30m or so time and again in the heat cannot be described as a conservation policy. It was madness. It failed to achieve anything other than tiring a brilliant runner and exposing him to injury or a card or two. 

When I watched Jordan, a natural and gifted try-scorer, being required to chase high balls, I thought it was a disgrace - rather like requiring Phar Lap to compete in a steeplechase.

The original sin with this All Black side, though, was the selection of Sam Cane as captain before the 2020 season had actually started. 

In the past, All Black captains were selected from certain starters in the run-on side. This is the way the Australian cricket captain, a similar sort of position, is chosen. History shows that for both teams, selecting someone assured of his position in the side as captain works well.

The problem that Foster created for himself and any team he selected with this first decision as the All Blacks' new coach was that there was a much better player available for the number 7 jersey, Ardie Savea. 

His solution of playing Savea at number 8 merely enhances the coach-created problem. Savea at 103 kg and 190 cm is big for a number 7, but far too small for a number 8.

Savea is the best loose forward in the All Blacks pack, but he is not the best number 8 available. Even though he invariably plays well, as he did against France, the loose forward trio is unbalanced with him at number 8. 

This is a position where size is important. Kieran Read, on the small side as number 8, was 111 kg and 193 cm. The current Springbok number 8, Duane Vermeullen, plays at 120 kg and 193 cm.

There is a rugby adage that goes to the crux of the problem the All Blacks could not solve against France: the team that controls the advantage line wins the game. 

The All Blacks could not control the advantage line against France because they lacked the power and muscle to dominate the French pack. 

The All Blacks pack - unlike the Wallabies, say, in their match against Georgia - played small, not big. They were pressurised by a big French pack, playing big, into conceding 13 penalties to the five penalties conceded by France. 

Six of the All Blacks' penalties were conceded on attack and seven were conceded on defence. This suggests that the All Blacks were under pressure both when they had the ball and when France had the ball.

The French also were able to off-load 15 times to the seven achieved by the All Blacks.

The all-important battle of the collisions, as these statistics and the scoreline indicate, was won around the field by France.

Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese philosopher on war, postulated that "the battle is won before it is fought".

Rugby is not warfare. But it is a war game. If the All Blacks keep the same tactics, the same backline and forward strategies and selections they played against France, I fear that their battle to win the 2023 RWC tournament has already been lost.

 

Guest post: Spiro Zavos on Australian rugby and the Folau factor

Former Wellington journalist Spiro Zavos wrote a highly regarded rugby column in the Sydney Morning Herald for nearly 30 years. He is the author of "How to Watch a Game of Rugby". Here Spiro brings his insight to bear on a crucial factor behind the decline of Australian rugby and ponders whether Eddie Jones can repair the damage.

Eddie Jones took over a Wallabies side on 29 January 2023, seven months ago, that was jaded, too old, falling rapidly into second-tier status and most importantly was divided on race and religious grounds because four years ago Rugby Australia sacked the soul of the side, as far as the Polynesian players were concerned, Israel Folau.

In preparing his squad for the 2023 Rugby World Cup tournament, Jones has responded to this problem of a team that had no morale by making two crucial decisions.

First, he has sacked most of the senior members of the Wallabies side he inherited, including its leadership group.

Second, he has appointed an outsider from the squad who happens to be Polynesian, Will Skelton, as the captain.

In my opinion, Jones is correct to do this even though the short-term problems involved with creating a new side in a few months could make the coming World Cup tournament a painful learning experience for his side - and for all Wallabies supporters.

There is method, in other words, in the Jones madness.

This wilful destruction of the Wallabies spirit by the Australian rugby class is a story that has essentially been neglected by an anodyne and compromised rugby media.

From the moment the then CEO of Rugby Australia, New Zealander Raelene Castle, decided to sacrifice Folau to appease big business interests, the Wallabies were doomed.

This is not to endorse what Folau did or said. It is to state the fact that Folau was the leader on and off the field for the significant number of Christian Polynesian players in the Wallabies squad. He was the team's talisman and, perhaps most importantly the side's main try-scorer.

The Polynesian players made representations to RA and to their trade union, RUPA, after Folau was sacked to find out what they could say about the woke policies RA enforced on them. RA and RUPA refused to tell them. So the punishment given to Folau was potentially theirs, too, if they expressed religious views similar to his.

Take the case of Samu Kerevi, the only other world-class Wallaby in recent years, aside from Folau.

Kerevi was born in Fiji. His father is a pastor. He was one of the Wallabies who "liked" Folau's "hell awaits gay people" post.

He told ABC documentary-makers for a programme on the Folau issue that none of Folau's supporters in the team were allowed to "say anything about supporting Izzy or saying anything at all".

While denying Kerevi and his fellow Polynesian Wallabies their rights to express their religious beliefs, the leadership of the Wallabies, including the captain Michael Hooper, said they would never play with Folau again.

The new coach, New Zealander Dave Rennie, also insisted that he was committed under the terms of his appointment never to select Folau for the Wallabies.

Kerevi reacted against all of this hostility to Folau by leaving Australia to play his rugby in Japan.

In my view, the expulsion of Folau and its subsequent creation of disenchantment by Wallabies Polynesian players was the main reason why, under Rennie, the national side then created the dismal a record of winning only 38 per cent of their Tests.

The most important signs that Eddie Jones understands how much damage was done to the morale and integrity of the Wallabies by the rejection of Folau is his clean sweep of most of the older white Wallabies who were in leadership positions under Rennie.

This has been followed by the first appointment of a new captain from outside the Australian rugby environment that piled on against Folau.

Jones has been open with journalists about the risks involved with what he has done: "Obviously I'd like to have a better win-loss record but we've destabilised the team, we've taken away all the leadership that was there previously, we've got a new leadership team in its place.... we do have a longer-term plan in terms of the World Cup ..."

There are clear risks with this scorched earth policy.

Steve Hansen, the former All Blacks coach, remarked after his three-day look at the Jones training regime that the new group of Wallabies were a "nice group of young men ... they are very excited about the World Cup tournament ... but the leadership group is not in the same place as the All Blacks ..."

We saw examples of this lack of leadership during the France-Australia RWC warm-up match last weekend. The Wallabies could not cope when France opened up play out wide, a weakness that was never shut down throughout the match.

The new Skelton Wallabies did present a strong scrum and a competent lineout against France. This is a reflection of the fact that Jones has based a number of his selections, in the backs and in the forwards, on size, something that has been lacking in the Wallabies for some years.

The Wallabies scored three tries to the five of France, a better outcome than the All Blacks managed against the Springboks.

There is a belief expressed in most commentaries that the Wallabies have an easy route to the semi-finals.

Admittedly, France, Scotland, New Zealand, South Africa and Ireland - the top-ranking rugby nations and all sides with the potential to win the RWC tournament - are all on the same side of the draw.

Indeed, the South Africa/Ireland/Scotland pool seems to be the most lethal "pool of death" in any pool in the history of the RWC tournament.

For this tournament, though, the second lethal pool is Australia's.

Starting on September 10, the Wallabies play Georgia (a team with one of the most impressive packs in Europe), September 18 Fiji (a team ranked above them, coming off an historic victory over England at Twickenham), September 25 Wales (a traditional rival with a good winning record against the Wallabies) and October 2 Portugal (the only assured victory for the Wallabies in the pool).

And the Wallabies are diving into this pool with five successive defeats this year. As Tom Decent in the Sydney Morning Herald has pointed out, this "is the worst pre-World Cup record in the last 20 years".

Twenty years ago, the Wallabies went into the RWC tournament with four losses from five Tests. The team fought its way through to the final in which a field goal in extra time gave victory and glory to England.

The Wallabies coach in 2003 was Eddie Jones. Can lightning strike twice for him and his new team?

■ Spiro, who is now 86, coached the St Patrick's College Silverstream Third Grade "C" rugby team, of which I was a member, in 1966. Our record for the season was: played 7, won 5, drew 1, lost 1. I had never played rugby before and knew so little about the game that Spiro had to come onto the field at half-time and turn me around. 

Tradition, pride, camaraderie ... but most of all, money

(First published in the Curmudgeon column, The Dominion Post, May 10.)

REMEMBER the euphoria that greeted the announcement that New Zealand would host the Rugby World Cup 2011? Well, it’s rapidly evaporating.

The realisation has dawned that this event is being staged not so much for the benefit of heartland rugby lovers – the so-called “stadium of four million”, to quote the seductive PR line New Zealand rugby bosses used in their successful Cup bid – as for the interests of World Rugby Inc and its big-business partners, the satellite TV broadcasters and corporate sponsors.

Oh, and we shouldn’t forget the politicians, who will doubtless be granted access to the plushest hospitality boxes in return for their tireless cheerleading efforts.

I detect a mood of growing public scepticism and disenchantment, even among rugby fans. You know something has gone seriously wrong when a high-profile sports writer, the New Zealand Herald’s Chris Rattue, declares we were sold a pup.

Economists are pooh-poohing the projected economic returns from the RWC as wildly optimistic Even the potential global TV audience is said to have been greatly overstated.

The RWC website tells us the event is all about tradition, pride, intensity and camaraderie. Strangely, it neglects to mention the real driving force, which is money.

It’s all about money. We spend it, and the International Rugby Board pockets it.

We spend it in the form of massive public investment – one estimate puts it at $1 billion-plus – in stadiums and infrastructure, to ensure everything is up to the ultra-fussy standards of the IRB and the broadcasters. Never mind that the country is already awash in debt and floundering economically.

We also spend it in the form of admission prices, which are far higher for All Black matches than for any other games. Tickets to watch the ABs range from $61 for a child in the least desirable seating areas to $460 for a “Category A” adult, plus a $15 “handling fee” for every ticket. We may be generously underwriting the event, but clearly there are no concessions to New Zealand rugby fans.

Visitors from overseas are being ripped off too, as greedy accommodation providers hike room rates by as much as 500 percent. It’s hardly surprising that interest from Australia is reported to be sluggish, with one travel agent quoted as saying rugby fans are balking at paying $5000 to cross the Tasman for just one game.

Greed may turn out to be the undoing of the RWC, and it starts with the organisers.

In the meantime, countless operators of legitimate businesses are fretting that they will fall foul of the ridiculous and repressive Major Events Management Act by mentioning forbidden words such as “world” and “rugby” in their advertising.

If I may use a sleazy metaphor, New Zealand is like a helpless maiden being ravaged while the politicians, the very people who should be protecting her, hold her down and insist she’s enjoying it.

* * *

OF COURSE, none of the above stops me from hoping New Zealand will win the Webb-Ellis trophy. We might as well salvage whatever pride we can from this costly extravaganza.

But as Sydney rugby guru Spiro Zavos warns, nothing can be taken for granted. Promoting his book How To Watch The Rugby World Cup 2011, Zavos says there are half a dozen teams that are capable of winning “on the day”.

The All Blacks may be rated the best in the world, but when it comes down to the RWC final, assuming they make it that far, the result may turn on something as fickle as the bounce of the ball or a referee’s call.

I like Zavos’s laconic response when people ask him who’s going to win. “We’re having a rugby match to find that out,” he tells them.

* * *

I BET I wasn’t the only person who bristled at the electronic signboards on all the highways over Easter weekend sternly reminding us that the police were out on the roads in numbers.

There’s something irritating about this finger-wagging approach to policing. It’s not only intrusive, in a slightly unsettling Big Brother fashion, but patronising too.

The underlying assumption seems to be that all motorists are rampant hoons in the making, kept in check only by the knowledge that the police are watching us and ready to pounce.

This head-prefect approach goes hand-in-hand with the increasing propensity for senior police officers to lecture us on our supposed behavioural failings – for example, tut-tutting over liquor consumption.

Fear of the cops is no bad thing. In fact I think it should be encouraged. But public respect for the police isn’t enhanced by their fondness for nannying us. Most people, I’m sure, would prefer them to concentrate on collaring villains rather than instructing us to sit up straight and eat our greens.

Incidentally, the electronic signboards at Easter were a giant fib. In several hundred kilometres of driving, I saw hardly a single police car.